GAAP allows unusual or infrequent items to be reported as special items in
Introduction
Accounting researchers have long studied the relation between earnings releases and security prices. It is well known that the release of earnings information affects the security returns behavior of the announcing firms as well as non-announcing firms in the same industry (Freeman and Tse, 1992; Han and Wild, 1990 ).
This intra-industry information transfer is employed in this study to examine a contentious point between GAAP and IFRS with respect to the treatment of special items in the income statement. IAS 1 specifically prohibits the presentation of any item of income and expense as "extraordinary item" either in the statement of comprehensive income or in the accompanying notes. The IASB concludes that the so-called unusual in nature and/or infrequent in occurrence items are actually the results of the normal business risks faced by an entity and do not warrant presentation as a separate component of the statement of comprehensive income. However, under GAAP, which is an income statement oriented reporting system for the valuation of the reporting entity, transitory income items should be separated from recurrent items to provide capital market with relevant information for valuation purposes.
The main critique leveled against the FASB"s special items reporting rules is that they are laxative and management routinely employs this provision for earnings management, i.e., reporting operating losses as special items and one-time only gains as core earnings to bias investors" perception of firm"s economic performance and share price (Cain et al. 2014) . Thus, IASB insists that prohibition of special item reporting can result in greater comparability across firms.
The contention between IFRS and GAAP centers on the opportunities for intra-period earnings management. Although extant empirical evidence confirms the prevalence of intra-period earnings management, the argument ignores the effect of special item reporting on the motivation for inter-period earnings management. That is, when the losses are indeed transitory and reporting them as special items can cast a less unfavorable light on the reporting entity, management may be more willing to include such losses in the income statement for the period in which they occurred, rather than deferring to future periods. Although the afforded opportunities for earnings management cannot be completely eliminated, allowing management to report special items actually renders more relevant information about special items announcing firms" earnings potential and this enhanced relevance may outweigh the loss of reliability.
One of the sources of relevant accounting information is earnings of other firms in the same industry. Instead of concentrating on examining the stock price reactions of the special items reporting firms (SI firms), this study examines the relevance of special items by examining the contemporaneous stock price behavior of the non-special items firms (NSI firms). Material asset impairments are often industry phenomena, timely disclosure provides more relevant information about the economic condition that may also affect other firms in the industry. For example, if timely inventory write-off had been provided by Lucent Technologies when dot com began to unravel might have prompted analysts to provide timely investment advices and lessened the adverse effect of the bubble (Palepu et al. 2004 ). This information is not only value-relevant to Lucent, but also value-relevant to other firms in the same industry. Thus, while concentrating on intra-period earnings management of the reporting firms, accounting regulatory bodies should also consider the positive effect on the heightened incentive for timely recognition of losses in deciding whether to permit or forbid separately reporting special items when management can substantiate that the item is indeed transitory.
This study examines the abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date of a sample of 563 firms that announced special item losses related to asset impairments equal to or larger than 3% of total net assets in their annual earnings (SI firms) and contemporaneous price movements of all NSI firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry over the period from 2001 to 2007. If material special items convey information about industry commonalities, the significance of special items goes beyond simply about individual firm"s general business risk. If special items reporting practice motivates timely reporting of losses by management and provides investors with more timely information about both the SI and NSI firms in the same industry, then this reporting practice warrants special consideration by accounting rule-setting bodies.
The information transfer of special item announcements is tested using a standard event study methodology. This study employs both the non-directional and the directional tests of the security returns of SI and NSI firms with abnormal returns from the single-index market model. For the non-directional test, which is based on the contemporaneous return variability, the results are generally consistent with the notion that special items provide value-relevant information about NSI firms in the same industry. The association indicates that special items are regarded by investors as value-relevant in reflecting information about the prevailing economic conditions in the industry.
However, the results of directional tests do not produce statistically significant association of stock price movements at 5% level between SI firms and NSI firms in the same industry. The result indicates that the information content of special items is garbled. An obvious reason, one can argue, is due to the opportunities of earnings management. Although other explanations such as both the rival effects and the contagion effects are operative at the same time for different firms in the same industry, our results imply that in order to increase the usefulness of earnings information, accounting rule-setting bodies should permit special items reporting practice but require stricter rules so that only truly transitory items can be reported as special items.
The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides literature review; Section 3 provides hypotheses development and methodology; Section 4 provides sample description; empirical results are provided in Section 5 and conclusions are provided in Section 6.
Literature Review
Earlier research on special items has examined market reactions at the release of special item information and the whether managers use special items to manage earnings. Focusing on material asset write-offs, Elliott and Shaw (1988) report significantly negative one-and two-day stock returns at the time of the announcements. Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) conclude that the contemporaneous market reaction to special items depends on their nature. For example, their results show negative reactions to inventory write-offs (consistent with the write-offs conveying information about declines in economic circumstances) and positive reactions to special item charges (consistent with these items conveying information about improving future prospects). Elliott and Hanna (1996) suggest at least two reasons to believe that the presence of special items in income makes it more difficult for users to determine recurring earnings. First, firms may transfer current (or future) normal operating expenses into special items, thereby increasing current (or future) earnings before special items. Second, write-offs may be associated with unusual and difficult to interpret economic circumstances. Kinney and Trezevant (1997) report that firms with large positive or large negative earnings changes are more likely to recognize negative special items, consistent with smoothing (for the positive changes) and big bath (for negative changes) behaviors of inter-period transfers. These studies provide comprehensive evidence that management uses special items reporting provisions to engage in earnings management.
Recent studies focus on the nature of special items as an income construct and management motivation in reporting them. Riedl and Srinivasan (2010) report that special items receiving the income statement presentation, as opposed to footnote disclosure, signals its lacking of persistence in future income. Cready et al. (2012) find that management uses restructuring charges to signal real improvement of firm"s future earnings whereas asset write-offs do not. Their study focuses on taking big bath as inter-period transfer of loss. Our study argues that special item reporting promotes timely recognition of losses and enhances relevance, rather than big bath behavior. Cain et al. (2014) finds that only two-thirds of 13,174 special items over the period 1989-2011 are actually transitory in nature. Cain et al. (2014) advocates permitting, but stricter reporting rules for special items since transitory items have different effects on firm valuation. Our study establishes the value relevance of special items by arguing that benefit of more flexible reporting rules improves relevance by promoting timely recognition of losses.
Although the current study examines the difference between IFRS and GAAP in special items reporting rules, we do not intend to pit one against the other. Each has its merits and downsides. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) examine the difference in earnings management behavior under IFRS after switching from GAAP. Presumably, high quality accounting standards should lessen the tendency of earnings management and IFRS is generally regarded as higher quality standards. However, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) did not find a significant difference in earnings management under GAAP and IFRS. We argue that flexibility can better promote accounting quality than restrictions.
Hypotheses Formulation
An information transfer examined in this paper arises when the information releases of firm i (k,...., z) can be used to make inferences about the share price distribution of firm j,
P is the share price of firm i and
One motivation for this hypothesis arises from research documenting that the earnings of firms are affected by (a) economy factors, (b) industry factors, and (c) firm specific factors. In this paper, the concern is with (b). The earnings releases of other firms in the same industry are one source of information on the impact of industry-wide trends for any single firm. This is especially true in the case of material losses. Management may wish to disguise them as transitory losses and report them as special items. These special item announcements contain information about industry commonalities and constitute one possible source of information transfer arising from the earnings releases of firm i.
Two hypotheses regarding information transfer are tested in this paper. First, non-directional tests of security returns are conducted to examine information transfers associated with special items announcements. The motivation for non-directional tests relates to the lack of a well defined "theory" relating price reactions of special items and non-special items firms. In null form, the first hypothesis states that there is no abnormal return to the equity of non-announcing firm j associated with the earnings release of announcing firm i, if i and j are in the same industry. Rejection of the null provides evidence that special items contain industry-relevant information that extends beyond the announcing firms.
Denoting j u as a residual return metric for firm j and i  as the act of an earnings release by firm i, this hypothesis may be stated formally as
If this null non-directional hypothesis is rejected, then a stronger hypothesis may be framed concerning the direction of the abnormal returns experienced by special items and non-special items firms. The second hypothesis is twofold, i.e., the direction and magnitude of intra-industry information transfers are predicted to be related to the security return reaction of the special items firms. Specifically, the second null hypothesis examined is that the sign of the expected abnormal return for NSI firm j, conditional on the abnormal returns of special items announcing firm i, is unrelated to the sign of firm i"s abnormal return. The alternative hypothesis is that the conditional expected abnormal return for NSI firm j is in the same direction as the abnormal return of announcing firm i conditioned on its own earnings release. This hypothesis may be stated formally as
Sample Selection
Our sample consists of firms that announced fourth quarter negative special items (Compustat item #32) exceeding 3% of beginning fourth quarter assets from [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Note that special items as reported by Compustat are not limited to those defined by GAAP, but also include items reported in the footnotes, but not shown separately on the income statement (Burgstahler et al. 2002, p. 590) . Our selection period starts in 2001 and terminates in 2007 to avoid the effects from the capital market crash in 2008. From the initial sample, we eliminate special items recorded after mergers, since these programs usually aim to eliminate redundancies rather than to deal with troubled operations. We also exclude firms in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, as they are subject to court oversight which may affect disclosure. We also impose the standard data requirements of daily stock returns from the CRSP New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ files.
The sampling procedures yield the sample of 563 firms. We consider the four digits SIC codes for each special items firm from CRSP. The average number of NSI firms for each SI firm is 10.5, ranging from 3 to 26. 
Methodology and Empirical Results
We employ the event study methodology to examine the information content of special items. The expected price is derived from the market model of the form suggested by Sharpe (1963 Sharpe ( , 1964 :
where , it R , is the daily stock return for firm i on day t, , Mt R is the return on a value-weighted market portfolio for day t. The models" parameters,ˆi  ,ˆi  are derived from ordinary least-squares regression using returns from day -220 to day -21 (i.e., the estimation period), where day 0 is the special items announcement date.
Non-Directional Test Results
In non-directional test, we focus on abnormal return behavior (whether positive or negative) for the special items and non-special items firms at the special items announcement date. This approach is based on the concept that variability of abnormal returns of special item represents the amount of unexpected (positive or negative) information about earnings containing special item. For this purpose a standardized cumulative price variance (SCVR) metric, similar to the one derived from Foster (1981) 
where L equals ( 21 1 tt ), l  is the lag l autocorrelation coefficient of the residuals of the pricing model, and 2 i S is the variance of the regression"s error terms from the market model"s estimation period. This cumulative variance metric is derived for all special items and non-special items firms.
Intra-industry information transfer is said to occur when the abnormal return variability of special item firms is related to that of the NSI firm at the time of special items announcements. The test is based on the spearman rank correlation ( s  ) between SCVR's of SI and NSI firms at the portfolio level. In addition, regression analyses of non-special items firms" SCVR on its corresponding special items firms" SCVR are conducted using both portfolio (p) and individual ( i ) firm SCVRs,
The expectations for the non-directional test, and consistent with the existence of intra-industry information transfer, are s  >0,  >0, and  >1.
The non-directional test results are presented in Table 2 . Panel A of Table 2 presents the market model"s SCVR return metrics for special items and non-special items firms. The SCVR in Panel A.1 indicate a significant increase in price variability for special items firms at the special items announcement date. The average SCVR for the special items firms at {-1,0} is 3.244. The last row of Panel A1 presents the number of observations in each category at {-1,0}. Notice that of the 563 special items firms, 12% (67/563) have SCVR values less than 1.0 at {-1, 0}.
The abnormal return variability of non-special items firms is presented in Panel A.2 of Table 2 . The average SCVR value at {-1.0} for non-special item firms is 1.172. A comparison of SCVR values of portfolios A through D for the special items and non-special items firms yields additional insights. Both the price variability of SI and NSI firms at the time of special item announcements increased at announcement date. Although the return variability of non-special items firms is substantially less than the special items firms; however, the ranking order of SCVR values of Portfolios A, B, and C for NSI firms is identical to that of the SI firm. The results indicate special items are value-relevant and therefore warrant separate reporting.
The analysis in Panel B of Table 2 extends that of panel A to conduct more powerful statistical tests of return behavior. Panel B presents results from regressing the SCVR of NSI firms on the SCVR of SI firms. For analysis at the portfolio level, the intercept ( r ) is significantly different from zero (at the 0.01 level), while the slope ( ) is significantly different from zero at 0.05 level, suggesting that non-special items firms exhibit above average price variability and that their reaction is related (in magnitude) to the special items firms" price reaction. For individual firm analysis, the intercept ( r ) and the slope ( ) are significantly greater than zero, suggesting that non-special items firms exhibit above average price variability, and that their reaction is positively associated with (in magnitude) that of special items firms". Therefore, the results in Table 2 are consistent with following interpretation: (1) the return variability of NSI firms is consistent with information transfer of special items announcement; (2) at the portfolio level, special items firms with above (below) average price activity do yield significant above (below) average price activity for non-special items firms; and (3) the individual special items firms with above (below) average price activity also yield significant above (below) average price activity for non-special items firms in the same industry. 
Directional Test Results
Evidence of non-directional information content and transfer motivate interest in stronger hypotheses concerning its directional nature. The directional tests of return behavior involve nonparametric Spearman rank correlation analyses and regression analyses. Two metrics are developed to represent the unexpected information conveyed in special items announcements. The first metric utilizes the direction and magnitude of special item firms" abnormal returns, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the special items firm i over the period 1 t to 2 t , is Where , it u is a directional measure of abnormal return activity. The NSI firm"s reaction metric is similarly derived from its abnormal returns:
The directional tests examine if CAR values of SI firms and those of NSI firms in the same industry are correlated. Specifically, the special items firms are initially ranked in ascending order on the basis of CAR. Next, the firms are divided into twenty portfolios of an approximately equal number of firms, from which the average CAR for firms in each portfolio p, denoted SI p CAR , is computed. Corresponding to each SI firms" portfolio p is a portfolio comprised of NSI firms in the same industries as the special items firms. The average cumulative abnormal returns for portfolio p of NSI firms" portfolio vector is denoted Table 3 presents the abnormal return behavior of the full sample of NSI firms categorized on the SI firms" CAR. The market model"s abnormal returns for the full sample of non-special items firms indicate no significant directional reaction (0.062%) at the time of the special items announcement.
Panel B of Table 3 expands the descriptive analysis of directional return behavior in Panel A to incorporate more powerful statistical tests and to examine for any magnitude relation. Panel A displays market model abnormal returns for the SI firms (twenty portfolios, rank-ordered) and their corresponding NSI firms. The pattern of CAR values of the non-special items firms tends to be unrelated to those of the special items firms. Hence, this result is not consistent with the direction and magnitude of a special items firm"s abnormal returns acting as a determinant of the direction and magnitude of the abnormal returns of other firms in its industry. Portfolios are comprised of n firms and %POS is the percent of positive CAR among the non-special items firms. Test of the significance of %POS is computed for the null hypothesis of %POS equal to the special items firms" %POS sample proportion -the proportion is 0.50 for the market model abnormal returns. c The Spearman rank correlation is computed between the special items (SI) and non-special items (NSI) firms" CAR portfolios.
d
Parameter estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) are presented for regressions using portfolio (p) and individual (i) firm CAR. Table 3 extends the analysis of Panel A to consider jointly any magnitude relation and any reaction to the act of the special items announcement on non-special item firms" market model returns. The regression results, based on portfolio and individual firms" CAR, provide no evidence of a positive magnitude relation (  ) between special items and non-special item firms" abnormal returns. In portfolio level analysis, both the intercept ( r ) and the slope ( ) are not significant. For individual firm analysis, the slope ( ) is positive as expected, however, the magnitude is insignificantly different from 0.
Conclusions
This paper investigates whether special item announcements affect the share prices of non-special items firms in the same industry to establish if special items convey value-relevant earnings information. The sample is composed of 563 special items firms and 5936 firms in the same industries during the period 2001-2007. We use both non-directional and directional tests of security return behavior to examine the association between special items firms and other firms in the same industries. Our results show that non-special items firms experience significant abnormal returns variability associated with the earnings release of an SI firm in the same industry. This result provides evidence that special items convey value relevant information beyond earnings for investors to evaluate the economic environment of the special items firms. The policy implication is that the IASB"s strong position to prohibit special item disclosures in the income statement may not be warranted. Although the directional tests indicate that the information is not unambiguous, this lack of clear direction could be due to the widely acknowledged earnings management opportunities due to the lax reporting rules. A solution to this problem, as also advocated by Cain et al. (2014) , can be stricter disclosure rules with respect to the nature and amount of special items. Accounting rule-setting bodies should adhere to the conceptual framework of providing relevant and reliable accounting information for investors and creditors to make economic decisions. This mandate requires rule setting bodies to be more conciliatory rather than taking "either or" position in setting rules for special items.
